The continued rise in popularity of social media (SM) and its evolutionary nature has seen it utilised not only by individuals to socially connect, but also by information organisations to promote their organisation and share relevant information with the community. This trend has extended into the educational sector, with school libraries using SM such as Facebook to communicate with and engage local communities, particularly in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic (Kimmons & Rosenberg, 2022; Rosenberg et al., 2021). School libraries have successfully employed SM to communicate with and engage their audiences: students, parents and community members (Magee et al., 2012; Kingsley, 2018). Beyond posting about new collection items and opening times, Teacher Librarians (TLs) have found much success in posts that highlight student work, achievements, accomplishments and involvement in programs; reminders about club meeting times; and directly communicate with individuals to answer queries and communicate reminders (Harmon & Messina, 2013). However, given the continual development of technology that increasingly interacts with such platforms, and the inherently public nature of such platforms and pages whose intent is to readily engage and communicate with the community, SM usage by school libraries has the potential to pose serious privacy risks and concerns for library users – in this case, students (Rosenberg et al., 2021).
Privacy concerns are not a new issue for SM platforms. Historically, large SM platforms have faced criticism for infringements of user’s privacy (Kimmons & Rosenberg, 2022), violations that continue to occur and are exacerbated by continued rapid technological advancement (Crocco et al., 2020). Indeed, the collection of personal information that is built into the very nature of sites such as Facebook make “privacy” an increasingly incompatible element of the site, where setting up an online identity is a prerequisite for use (Baccarella et al., 2018). Despite claims by some platforms that the collection of data does not occur (Warzel & Thompson, 2019), an examination of social media data policies such as Facebook’s makes it clear that such sites do, indeed, collect, store, and share user data “globally, both internally within the Facebook Companies and externally with our partners” (Tactical Technology Collective, 2018, para. 58). Furthermore, posts made on SM are automatically considered publicly available data, which results in the collection, use and “selling” of data (Crocco et al., 2020), including the analysis of images (Rosenberg et al., 2021). This data can then be used by anyone, regardless of their intent.
This has considerable implications for students’ online and physical privacy, who are often the focus of school library posts and are some of the most frequent users of SM (Martin et al., 2018). When TLs establish SM pages and ask students and parents to engage with the page they are facilitating this collection of data, as each interaction individuals make on SM platforms, from passive viewing to active engagement, creates “digital traces” of an individual (Tactical Technology Collective, 2024). These traces are collected to create shadow profiles of individuals that are used to monitor, store, and track data about individuals, as well as the individuals themselves (Ravn et al., 2020). Shadow profiles are contributed to if TLs post photographs of individuals, which has the potential to further exacerbate online privacy concerns. Such photos are permanent digital footprints “that can be retrieved later by classmates, teachers […] or the general public.” (Martin et al., 2018, p.215), and can lead to what Ravn et al. (2020) term “creep shots” – the non-consensual sharing of images. Furthermore, the development of facial recognition algorithms, some of which have the potential to predict individual political and sexual orientation, can lead to further exposure of privacy by collecting such images and storing them in shadow profiles, which can further expose individuals to discrimination and stalking online (Rosenberg et al., 2021). This steady build up of digital footprints therefore exposes users to the risk of spear-phishing – fake online accounts, online fraud and scams (Rosenberg et al., 2021). Clearly, then, the online privacy violations and dangers that arise from simple interactions with SM pages, and through the posting of images of individuals, are significant.
What is further concerning is the significant exposure of physical privacy, and thus the physical dangers individuals can face through this online privacy violation. This is first made evident when one considers the tracking of information conducted through associated apps, such as Messenger. If students or parents reach out to the school library through such means, the information communicated can be stored by Facebook (Tactical Technology Collective, 2018) and locations tracked through IP tracking extensions such as the “Marauders Map”, which allowed platforms to “map, and thus stalk, the identity, locations, and movements of all individuals in a conversation” (Baccarella et al., 2018, p. 434). Even posting photos celebrating and acknowledging student success and involvement in the library exposes student privacy. In such shots, students are automatically tied to a place, both through their association with the school library post, but also through other identifiable features that image analysis tools can access and store – school logos, identifiable locations, and even student names when identified in posts (Rosenberg et al., 2021). As with all data collected, these images contribute to individuals’ digital footprints, and can be accessed and used by anyone – even those without accounts on the social media platforms used.
These potential breaches of student online and physical privacy therefore have significant implications for TLs seeking to implement SM. First and foremost, given the potential exposure of student privacy through posts, parents should provide permission for images, names and other information to be shared online about their children (NSW Department of Education, 2020; Rosenberg et al., 2021). Extending beyond the NSW Department of Education social media policy (2020), the identification of students in posts through names should be limited to their first names only if required, and portrait style photos that are easily analysed or provide clear identifiable features of individuals should be avoided in order to further prevent violations of student privacy (Rosenberg et al., 2021). At all times, regardless of permissions to post received by parents, TLs must consider student privacy, and such posts should only be made on official SM accounts (NSW Department of Education, 2020). In light of this, TLs should consider making their library SM pages private to control who has access to the information posted (Rosenberg et al., 2021). Whilst this would increase the administrative load of TLs it would be another effective strategy to help mitigate the risks to student privacy that SM platforms inherently pose.
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Reference List
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